Does the Single Draft of COC in the South China Sea Matters? by Haryanto, Agus & Darmawan, Arief Bakhtiar
  
161  
  
DOES THE SINGLE DRAFT OF COC IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
MATTERS?  
 
Agus Haryanto1, Arief Bakhtiar Darmawan2 
 
1Department of International Relations, Universitas Jenderal Soedirman; 
email: agus.haryanto@unsoed.ac.id 
2Department of International Relations, Universitas Jenderal Soedirman;  
email: ariefbakhtiar@rocketmail.com 
 
 
Abstrak 
 
Tulisan ini bermaksud untuk mengelaborasi bagaimana dampak Draf Tunggal CoC 
dalam proses penyelesaian sengketa Laut Cina Selatan (LCS). Tulisan ini menggunakan 
konsep International Dispute Settlement Procedures (IDSPs) di mana para pihak 
berusaha untuk menyelesaikan persoalan berdasarkan hukum internasional. Tulisan ini 
memiliki argumen bahwa negara-negara di kawasan telah berupaya untuk memiliki 
mekanisme tata berperilaku sejak tahun 1990-an. Meskipun tahun 2018 negara-negara 
ASEAN dan Cina telah menyepakati Draf Tunggal CoC mengenai tata berperilaku di 
LCS, penyelesaian sengketa LCS masih jauh dari kata selesai. Draf Tunggal CoC hanya 
merupakan kumpulan usulan ASEAN dan Cina. Kelemahan-kelemahan Draf Tunggal 
terdiri dari kelemahan dari sisi legal status yang tidak menyebutkan secara jelas 
kewajiban negara-negara anggota dan cenderung tidak ketat karena tiap negara bisa 
menambah atau menarik usulan masing-masing. 
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Abstract  
 
This paper attempts to elaborate on the impact of the Single Draft of CoC in resolving the 
South China Sea (SCS) dispute. This paper uses the concept of International Dispute 
Settlement Procedures (IDSPs), where the parties try to resolve problems based on 
international law. This paper argues that countries in the region have been trying to have 
CoC mechanisms since the 1990s. Although in 2018, the ASEAN countries and China 
agreed on a Single Draft of CoC in the SCS, however the settlement of the SCS dispute 
is far from over. The CoC Single Draft is only a collection of ASEAN and China 
proposals. The Single Draft weaknesses in terms of legal status are they do not clearly 
state the obligations of each country to add or withdraw their respective proposals. 
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Introduction  
 
The problem of overlapping claims in the South China Sea (SCS) is a persistent and 
critical issue in Southeast Asia. The dispute directly involves five claimants, four are from 
within ASEAN namely Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei and one is The 
People's Republic of China. Indirectly, however, the dispute involves the rest of ASEAN 
member states and their respective interests in it (Darmawan and Mahendra, 2018: 79-
100; Simon, 2012: 997). The dispute has become even more complicated due to linkages 
to other issues such as China's rise, the threat of regional militarization, and international 
maritime law debate. To make matter worse, major powers such as the United States, 
China, and Russia dabbled in the dispute as a mean to exert their influences regarding the 
freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the area (Pattiradjawane, 2016: 9). Put 
simply, the dispute is a ticking time bomb that can go off at any minute. 
ASEAN states had repeatedly attempted to resolve the SCS dispute through various 
means. Although the dispute pitches member states against each other, ASEAN has been 
active in promoting a peaceful resolution (Simon, 2012: 997). In the last three decades, 
ASEAN and China have been taking part in various discussions in an attempt to establish 
a Code of Conduct (CoC) regarding the dispute (CSIS Expert Working Group, 2018: 2). 
Although ASEAN's first statement regarding this issue was made in 1992, the CoC itself 
was only officially recommended by ASEAN in 1996. In 2002, ASEAN and China finally 
agreed on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea after two 
years of negotiation. This agreement, however, was not a proper resolution. Three years 
after the declaration was agreed, the guide of implementation was finalized. The guide, 
however, would not be signed for another six years with the adoption occurring in 2012. 
During those years, the tension in the disputed region was a cause for concern, it still is. 
For example, in 2016, out of suspicion, the Philippines asked the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration to clarify the status of Spratly and Paracel Islands as well as China's nine-dash 
line.  
Amidst all the incidents, however, the dialogue between ASEAN and China got its 
second wind in 2017. ASEAN's officials and their Chinese counterparts finally agreed on 
the framework for the 14th Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in Manila Augusts 2017. This breakthrough 
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earned the coverage of both ASEAN-based (Dancel, 2017) and China-based (Xinhua, 
2017) news outlets. A year later, on 2nd of August 2018, Singaporean Foreign Minister 
Vivian Balakrishnan declared that both parties have agreed on a single draft for the CoC 
(CSIS, 2018:2). By tracing the milestones in SCS dispute resolution effort by ASEAN, 
this article aims to observe the negotiation process of CoC and to analyse the feasibility 
of the single draft as a long-term solution. During this time, the problem that often arises 
in the South China Sea conflict is the absence of a code of conduct. Therefore, since the 
2000s, conflicting parties have tried to develop a code of conduct in the southern Chinese 
Sea. This article argues that the deadlocks in the CoC negotiation process indicate that 
the resolution effort is still some way off from creating a binding and clear-cut code of 
conduct regarding the SCS conflict. This argument is further reinforced by the fact that 
the single draft contains only suggestions from ASEAN member states but not an actual 
resolution to the conflict itself.  
 
Concept and Method 
In this paper, the author uses the concept of the International Dispute Settlement 
Procedures (IDSPs). IDSPs are a set of procedures for making decisions on alleged 
violations of international legal norms (Zangl et al., 2011: 370). In a conflict, the parties 
involved and parties outside can be active in seeking a solution. Disputing parties can 
resolve problems among themselves through bilateral and multilateral negotiation 
schemes. In several cases, the parties cannot achieve a solution due to the complexity of 
the issues. Therefore, there are third parties who mediate based on international law. This 
third party is the party-appointed and agreed upon by the disputing parties to conduct 
institutionalized negotiations in resolving the disputed issue. Usually, these third parties 
are parties who are neutral or not directly involved in disputes. 
In addition to using third parties, countries can also use international instruments 
for resolving conflicts. For this reason, international law provides instruments for 
resolving disputes through this mechanism. For example, we can use the WTO 
mechanism to resolve trade disputes. Then, the state can also file a general dispute 
through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based on which is international treaty law. 
Although the mediation mechanism of some issues in relations between countries 
is precise, in practice, there are differences in implementation (Zangl et al., 2011). In the 
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context of territorial disputes, what is questioned by the state is sovereignty. In the context 
of a maritime dispute, the concept of sovereignty embraced by China is very different 
from the western model of sovereignty, for example, disputes over the sovereignty of the 
Spratly Islands and Paracels (Jacques, 2011: 325-326). The idea of maritime sovereignty 
based on the 1982 United Nations Convention (UN Nations Convention on The 
Sea/UNCLOS 1982) is the basis of the claims of various Southeast Asian countries for 
the Spratly Islands and Paracels. On the contrary, China bases its argument on "historical 
claims." Experts from China argue that: "A juridical fact must be weighed according to 
the laws of its time, not according to the law in force when disputes arise" (Jacques, 2011: 
326-327). In order to overcome this difference of views, since the 1990s, countries in 
Southeast Asia and China have sought documents on how to behave in the South China 
Sea. This Code of Conduct (COC) aims to reduce the escalation of conflicts in the South 
China Sea. 
 
Research Method 
This article uses qualitative historical analysis methods in International Relations. In 
general, this method attempts to interpret historical facts with a perspective of 
International Relations (Thies, 2002). In this method, researchers firstly parse the research 
source that is the primary source of documents and reports on the South China Sea 
disputes and secondary materials such as news in the mass media. Secondly, researchers 
read the whole document to determine the sequence of events in the conflict resolution 
efforts of the South China Sea. Thirdly, researchers’ analyses using the theory and 
concept in international relations—this paper using International Dispute Settlement 
Procedure (IDSP). Based on the concept of dispute settlement, this paper analyzes the 
historical fact in the process of negotiation among countries to deal with the code of 
conduct in the south china sea.  
 
Result and Discussion 
The Deadlock in the Code of Conduct Negotiation 
ASEAN's failure of establishing a single stance on crucial points of the SCS conflict 
during the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Cambodia invoked several interpretations 
by experts. Some called the failure indicated ASEAN's lack of effectiveness as a regional 
organization; others, however, see the incident in a better light and called the failure as 
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nothing more than a minor disagreement between members. To International Relations 
experts, especially those in conflict resolution, even ASEAN's mere effort to establish a 
unified stance on the conflict signified a new phase in the settlement process. The CoC is 
expected to form the foundation for regional stability in the long-term (Thuy, 2011:3). A 
t the very least, the CoC could provide a degree of certainty regarding how the disputing 
parties should behave in the dispute. 
Although the negotiation for CoC did not really take place until much later, the 
process toward such a breakthrough started as early as March 2000 when ASEAN and 
China came to a mutual understanding that an agreement of some form was needed on 
the SCS dispute. Both parties identified four main areas of disagreement: the geographic 
scope, restrictions on construction on occupied and unoccupied features, military 
activities in waters adjacent to the Spratly islands, and policies concerning detainment of 
fisherman found in disputed waters (Thayer, 2012:1). Although this mutual understanding 
could be seen as a step forward, it was later clear that agreement on those four issues 
could not be satisfyingly attained even though both parties aware that it will come a long 
way in imposing long-term peace and stability in the region. 
China finally agreed to renew the talk with ASEAN after several concerning 
incidents including the claim from The President of Republic of China (Taiwan), Lee 
Teng Hui, that legally, historically, geographically, and realistically, all of SCS including 
the Spratly Islands, is part of Taiwan's territorial sovereignty. Taiwan's Foreign Ministry 
on 13 July 1999 also condemned Malaysia's and Philippines's actions in the area. In 
addition to Taiwan's actions, China was also concerned with the Philippines's actions of 
sending their warship BRP Sierra Madre to Second Thomas Soal. As their protest was 
ignored, China retaliated by sending its navy to patrol the area. 
 After five years of negotiation, ASEAN and China finally agreed to sign the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) in November 2002 
in Phnom-Penh. In this declaration, both parties agreed to promote stability, peace, and 
development in the contested area. Thuy (2011) calls this agreement a bi-multilateralism, 
a portmanteau of bilateralism and multilateralism since China conducted a dialogue with 
ASEAN as a regional organization. The declaration's impact is evident from the fact that 
ever since its signing, no incident of note has happened in the contested area.  
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After the declaration in 2002, the next step is naturally to formulate the actual code. 
The code is considered to be of paramount importance among ASEAN; the 37th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting declared, “We reaffirmed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
(DoC) in the South China Sea, which we signed with China in Phnom Penh on 4 
November 2002, as an important step towards the adoption of the Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea that is crucial for promoting peace, security, and stability in the region”.  
This statement signified ASEAN's seriousness in finalizing the CoC as a mean to 
promote peace and stability in the SCS.  
To implement DoC, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on Strategic 
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in 2003 which aims to formulate a master plan for 
more comprehensive cooperation between ASEAN and China to improve the 
effectiveness of the DoC. Several steps were taken to that end, for example by holding 
ASEAN-China Senior Officials meeting, enforcing the DoC, reviewing the 
implementation process, and creating work groups which provided recommendations for 
the implementation.  
During the Joint Working Group Meeting (JWG) in Manila in August 2005, 
however, ASEAN and China could not agree on the agenda. Whilst ASEAN insisted on 
creating a draft for border dispute resolution China refused to discuss the matter, insisting 
that it could only be solved bilaterally with each concerned party. Another mishap 
between the two was the fact that ASEAN wanted to create an agreement as a unified 
party while China wanted to talk to ASEAN only after conducting bilateral meetings with 
"concerned parties." With that, in 2005, China's bi-multilateralism approach on the SCS 
dispute had been replaced with bilateralism once more (Thuy, 2011: 6; Thayer 2012: 1). 
 
Table 1 - Timeline of the Negotiation process of the Code of Conduct 
Year Milestones 
2002 The signing of the DoC between ASEAN and China 
2011 Guidelines for Implementation of DoC 
2011-2012 ASEAN formulated the draft for CoC  
July 2012 The failure to agree on the Joint Communiqué during the 45th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting 
September 2012 Indonesia proposed “The Zero Draft” 
May 2013 China agreed to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) for CoC 
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Source: CSIS, 2018; Thayer, 2012;  Thuy, 2011; and Valencia, 2013.  compiled by the authors.  
 
After 2005, no significant development occurred in the SCS dispute. ASEAN and 
China kept working in the CoC, while the contested region spotted several sporadic 
incidents. It was between 2009 and 2012 that there was a spike in the number of incidents 
in the area.  One of the most well-known was the clash between a Vietnamese survey ship 
and three Chinese patrol vessels occurred 120 km off the south-central coast of Vietnam 
or around 600km south of China's Hainan Island. Vietnam claimed that the Chinese boats 
deliberately cut the survey ship's cables in Vietnamese waters, but China denied the 
accusation. The response from ASEAN member states to this incident was the perfect 
showcase of how member states did not actually have a unified stance. As the relation 
between Vietnam and China heated up, Malaysia took China’s side in the hope of 
profiting off China’s economic boom. Malaysia went further and claimed that China's 
action in the area was due to American provocations.  
A significant development finally occurred in 2010 when ASEAN discussed the 
dispute through the framework of ASEAN Regional Forum. In the forum, ASEAN tried 
to create some sort of Balance of Power by inviting the US to participate actively. A year 
later, in front of the Australian parliament, President Obama made his famous of pivoting 
and rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific the Asia-Pacific region, evidence of American 
commitment to actively participate in the dispute settlement process. This commitment 
was showcased on the US’s participation in the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton declared that The US has an interest in the disputed area in the 
form of freedom of navigation, access to Asian waters, and to uphold international 
maritime laws. Clinton also declared that the US supports the collaborative effort of the 
organization, the implementation of DoC in 2002, the push for the agreement of CoC, and 
will prepare the effort for confidence-building measures hand-in-hand with the DoC. 
China responded to this statement by declaring that they are trying to increase 
confidence between disputing parties as an effort toward resolution proper. At the same 
time, however, senior diplomat Yang Jiechi also declared that the dispute could not be 
discussed at an international level. He also stated that DoC was not an agreement between 
China and ASEAN as an organization since the dispute can only be resolved by bilateral 
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means. Cooperation with ASEAN, he added, have been finalized in the framework of 
JWG consultations on DoC (Thuy, 2011: 16).   
In the 44th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting--which also served as ASEAN Regional 
Forum--in 2011, China and ASEAN came to an agreement over the Guidelines for the 
Implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The 
signing of the guidelines was the most significant breakthrough since the signing of the 
DoC on November 4th, 2002. It is also the highlight of Indonesian Chairmanship of 
ASEAN in 2011. The agreement opened the possibilities of implementing the declaration 
through cooperation between ASEAN and China in the contested area as well as served 
as the budding for a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea which would serve 
as an operational preventive measure and effective behavioural regulation. 
On July 2011, the framework for the implementation of the DoC was adopted as a 
pathway toward interparty dialogue. In the application, all agreed frameworks must be 
reported to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting. China, however, remained adamant 
of holding a talk with ASEAN regarding the SCS dispute only at the "appropriate time 
and situation." Such a position made it difficult for ASEAN members who have a stake 
in the dispute such as the Philippines and Vietnam. 
In January 2012, the Philippines proposed a draft informally called "Philippines 
Draft Code of Conduct." The eight-page draft proposed to transform the SCS into a "Zone 
of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation (ZOPFF/C). The Philippines proposed 
the promotion of cooperation in the area, a permanent working committee to implement 
ZOPFF/C, to reaffirm the use of UNCLOS 1982 in the resolution process, as well as 
proposing a dispute settlement mechanism. The draft was seriously discussed in ASEAN 
Senior Officials Meeting in 2012 in which member states were polarized into two camps. 
Cambodia proposed to invite China to the discussion so that if the meeting managed to 
formulate draft, China would be behind it as well. The Philippines and Vietnam, on the 
other hand, rejected the proposal as they believe that ASEAN should only hold a talk with 
China as a unitary actor and as such, the talk should only be held when all member states 
have adopted the same stance. 
On the seventh day of the meeting, it was decided that "[they] agreed to submit the 
draft ASEAN proposed key elements of the regional Code of Conduct in the South China 
Sea to the ASEAN SOM for consideration.” These key elements were discussed in the 
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45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2012. In the meeting, Kao Kim Hourn, 
Cambodian Foreign Minister, declared that ASEAN's senior officials have agreed to hold 
a meeting with their Chinese counterparts to talk about the South China Sea.  
In the aforementioned Ministerial Meeting, Indonesia took an active role. Foreign 
Minister Marty Natalegawa drafted a joint communiqué alongside Anifafh Aman from 
Malaysia, Albert del Rosario from the Philippines, and Pham Binh Minh from Vietnam. 
The draft, however, could not be agreed on time due to a crowded agenda. According to 
Thayer (2013) what happened at the meeting was caused by a deal made by China 
National Offshore Oil Company to explore mining prospect in Vietnamese EEZ. 
During the 45th Ministerial Meeting in Cambodia, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun 
Sen emphasized the importance of realizing ASEAN Community 2015 as a priority. He 
also declared that the implementation of DoC—including concluding the CoC 
negotiation—should be taken seriously. Unfortunately, similar to the year before, the 
meeting failed to agree on the joint communiqué. 
This failure piqued the interest of the world. Johnson (2012: 65) claimed that the 
failure was due to Hu Jintao's visitation to Cambodia just before the 20th ASEAN Summit 
in an attempt to prevent the SCS from being discussed in the summit. Cambodia, which 
held the chairmanship at the time, then decided to refrain from talking about the issue. 
This turn of events was unfortunate considering that the Philippines, Vietnam, and 
Thailand have drafted a revised version of the CoC to replace the 2012 version. Cambodia 
further muddied the water by suggesting that the draft should be discussed with China 
first to prevent a fall-out between ASEAN and China. 
ASEAN's failure to reach consensus was responded by Indonesian President at the 
time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, by instructing Foreign Minister Natalegawa to try and 
unify ASEAN members' stances through shuttle diplomacy. 
 
The Zero Draft Code of Conduct 
ASEAN's failure to agree on the 2012 version of the CoC was responded with a revised 
draft proposal from Indonesia. According to Thayer (2013), the step was not only 
Indonesia's attempt to unify the stances of ASEAN members but also to show the image 
of a unified ASEAN to the world. The attempt was mostly carried out through 
Natalegawa's shuttle diplomacy to five capitals--Manila, Hanoi, Bangkok, and Phnom 
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Penh within mere two days (Natalegawa, 2013; Thayer, 2013: 5). The shuttle diplomacy 
was a moderate success, and it gave birth to six-principles regarding the SCS dispute. 
The principles, as revealed by Nor Hamhong as ASEAN Chairman in July 20: (1) 
the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea 
(DoC), (2) the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DoC, (3) the early conclusion of 
a regional Code of Conduct in the East Sea (CoC), (4) the full respect of the universally 
recognised principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), (5) the continued exercise of self-restraint 
and non-use of force by all parties, and (6) the peaceful resolution of disputes in 
accordance with universally recognised principles of International Law, including the 
UNCLOS. (Natalegawa, 2013; Thayer 2013: 6) 
China responded to this effort by sending their Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to 
Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia. During a press conference in Jakarta, he declared that 
China wanted to implement DoC based on a consensus. During the meeting with 
Malaysian Foreign Minister Y.B. Datok Sri Anifah Aman in Kuala Lumpur, Aman stated 
that since there is still a problem of overlapping claims among ASEAN member, ASEAN 
must first resolve this problem among themselves before starting a discussion with China 
(Thayer 2013: 6). The statements shed light on the internal condition of ASEAN and 
improve China's position in the negotiation.  
On September 27, 2012, Indonesia presented the "Zero Draft a Regional Code of 
Conduct in the South China Sea” to ASEAN Foreign Ministers during a UN meeting in 
New York. The draft drew heavily from three previous agreements: 2002 DoC, ASEAN's 
proposal on CoC in 2012, and the aforementioned six principles (Thayer, 2013: 7) 
The draft consists of nine articles; in general: (1) basic principles, (2) the objective 
of CoC, (3) basis for the implementation of CoC, (4) geographical scope for CoC 
implementation, (5) provisions regarding territorial claim of the SCS area, (6) CoC 
implementation, (7) mechanism for monitoring and reporting for CoC, (8) dispute 
settlement mechanism, and (9) final provisions regarding the review of CoC every five-
year as dictated by the consensus.  
Natalagewa stated that the Zero draft would not be retroactive which means any 
actions committed by a signatory before the draft became official would not be considered 
as a violation. For example, both Vietnam and the Philippines have conducted several 
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joint military trainings with the US. Although the Zero draft prohibits these actions, they 
would not be reported as violations as it is committed before the draft became official. 
 
Table 2 - The Zero Draft Code of Conduct on South China Sea Dispute 
Important Articles in the Zero Draft: 
Objective (Article II) and basic provisions (Article III): 
1. Promote confidence and prevent incidents based on the principles of the Declaration of Conduct. 
2. Commitment to respect freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea. 
3. Settle territorial and jurisdiction dispute in the South China Sea through peaceful means on the basis of 
international law and UNCLOS. 
4. Commitment to exercise self-restraint in activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect 
peace and stability. 
5. Respect for the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf of the coastal states as per 
UNCLOS 1982. 
6. Respect for the CoC and the taking of actions consistent with it. 
7. The encouragement to other countries to respect all the objectives and the principles in the CoC. 
 
Area of Application (Article IV) 
Without prejudice to existing claims, CoC will be implemented on entire unresolved maritime boundary areas of 
the parties concerned in the South China Sea. 
 
Territorial Claims in the South China Sea (Article V) 
➢ Nothing in the CoC shall be used to: 
a. Refute any party's claim to strengthen one's own claim on the disputed area. 
b. Compromise the position or claim of any party to territory (or islands) in the South 
China Sea using or based on a recognition/refutation by a third party. 
 
➢ No action or activity is applicable if provisions from the CoC are brought upon by force.  
➢ All parties shall commit to the resolution of both territorial and jurisdictional disputes by 
peaceful means without resorting to force or a threat of force, through amicable consultations between 
sovereign states directly concerned in accordance with universally recognized principles of international 
law, including, but not solely, the 1982 UNCLOS. 
 
Rules and Procedures to Resolve Incidents (Article VI, Section 2) 
➢ concerned parties file a chronological report 
➢ post-incident talks must be held as soon as an incident occurs 
➢ a "hotline" communication line between foreign ministers shall be established 
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➢ utilizing existing Sino-ASEAN diplomatic channel 
➢ involving the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
➢ any unresolved incident may be referred to an appropriate international dispute settlement 
mechanism 
 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Article VIII) 
If the issue cannot be resolved within this ASEAN framework, then the parties could use the mechanisms 
provided by international law, including but not limited to UNCLOS.  
 
Valencia, in his article What the ‘Zero Draft’ Code of Conduct for the South China 
Sea Says (and Does not Say): Navigating Differences published in 2013 criticized 
Indonesia's suggestion in the draft. According to him, the suggestion was unrealistic and 
was very likely to be rejected by ASEAN. He claims that Indonesia's position in the 
dispute is ambiguous as Indonesia probably has an overlapping jurisdictional claim with 
China in the area around Natuna. In Valencia own words:  
“A fundamental problem facing Indonesian officials is that China does not really 
believe Indonesia is neutral in this affair. In fact, Indonesia and China probably 
have overlapping jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea, depending on the 
meaning of China’s historical “nine-dashed line,” which Indonesia has formally 
criticized at the United Nations” (Valencia, 2013 :73–74). 
In-depth, Valencia (2013: 78) reviewed the draft and concluded that it still has many 
flaws. First, he regards the term "parties" to be ambiguous, as it can refer to ASEAN 
member states or ASEAN as an organization. Second, he considers the clause "A 
commitment to use the area for 'peaceful purposes' only" "somewhat controversial" but 
without mentioning any specific. Third, the clause "A commitment to specific 
confidence-building measures like dialogue, prior notification of military activities in 
waters claimed by others, voluntary exchange of information etc.; A commitment to 
endeavour to determine and agree which features and areas are in dispute and which are 
undisputed.”; according to Valencia, the clause—which was suggested by the 
Philippines—is controversial as it implies that disputing parties can conduct military 
activities in areas claimed by others as long as they give a heads up. Fourth, the clause 
"promoting 'provisional arrangements of a practical nature' as provided in the DoC and 
UNCLOS"; according to Valencia, the clause could include "sharing or joint development 
of resources in areas of overlapping claims." Fifth, the clause "the parties will not take 
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any unilateral action in disputed areas that would jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a 
final agreement regarding the disputed area" is redundant since it is already in the 
UNCLOS. Finally, Valencia believes that the document should be signed by the heads of 
state to highlight the importance of the document and the commitment to its provisions. 
In conclusion, Valencia thinks the draft is "a step forward" and it does contain 
unprecedentedly bold proposal. However, this boldness would make it hard for all 
claimants within ASEAN to agree to the entirety of the document, let alone China. Such 
a deadlock would make it difficult for other parties that have a stake in the disputed are--
such as the US. In short, Valencia calls the draft "a bridge too far." 
Regardless of the overreaching nature of the draft, Indonesia still showed admirable 
commitment to see it through during the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Thayer (2013: 
11) says that Indonesia has taken a crucial role during a time of crisis for ASEAN. In the 
meeting, ASEAN member states were involved in a heated debate to the point that 
Indonesia offered a "non-paper" CoC. Indonesia, with Singapore's support, also attempted 
to compromise in the meeting by formulating a joint communiqué. It was a controversial 
move at the time but it was also the most logical way to make conflicting parties meet 
halfway. Thayer concludes in his article: 
“During the recriminations between Cambodia and the Philippines at the 45th 
AMM and later in the year Indonesia stepped in and played a crucial role in 
forging consensus among ASEAN members on a Regional Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea. During the heated debate at the 45th AMM Retreat Indonesia 
offered to submit a ‘non-paper’ on the CoC. Indonesia and Singapore both 
attempted to broker a compromise over the wording of the controversial AMM 
joint communiqué” (Thayer, 2013: 11). 
Indonesia's objective with the draft can be inferred from Natalegawa's statement 
during his 2013 Annual Ministerial Press Release which stated that the draft was merely 
a beginning. The draft was meant to reel ASEAN and China back to the table. He stated: 
“When doubts appeared regarding ASEAN's unified stance on the SCS issue, 
Indonesia carried out shuttle diplomacy which in mere thirty-six hours consolidated 
ASEAN's with the six-point principles. Next, Indonesian diplomacy pushed for the 
full implementation of the DoC--which include a regional code of conduct--through 
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agreement on the basic elements of the code as well as the formulation of an early 
draft of CoC” (Natalegawa, 2013). 
Indonesia meant to "encourage the establishment of diplomatic communication so 
that conflicting parties will prioritize diplomatic channel for dispute settlement” 
(Natalegawa, 2013). Indonesia wanted to erase the image that peace and stability in Asia-
Pacific are under threat from an in-fighting between regional powers. Indonesia also 
wanted to manage the potential conflict so that it can be turned into potential cooperation. 
According to Natalegawa, such a paradigm is a novelty in the SCS dispute.  
The Zero Draft is actually Indonesia's way of testing the water and sees the reactions 
of ASEAN member states to the failure in Cambodia. Although the Zero Draft was not 
officially adopted yet, it does succeed in reeling concerned parties to a discussion which 
may yield a legally binding document. According to Indonesia, China is in a desperate 
position when Modi seemed to have inched closer to Japan as indicated by Modi's choice 
of making Japan his first country to visit after his inauguration as PM. In addition to that, 
the US is also perceived to be a threat by China when they established political and 
security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam. In such a desperate position, the 
logical choice for Beijing was to embrace ASEAN and the zero draft consequently 
became a rational choice, not only for ASEAN but also for China.  
 
Evaluating the Single Draft 
In August 2018, ASEAN and China agreed on the Single Draft of CoC. It was only a year 
before, in August 2017, that ASEAN and China started to entertain the possibility of 
agreeing on the CoC framework. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi affirmed that 
agreeing to the framework indicates China's willingness to promote stability in SCS. 
Nevertheless, Wang Yi also asserted that CoC is not an instrument to resolve territorial 
conflict and maritime delimitation issue in SCS. Instead, Wang Yi saw the code as an 
attempt at promoting confidence, willingness to cooperate, and an environment suitable 
for the pursuit of peaceful resolution. Although the framework itself does not explicitly 
explain to what extent the CoC will be legally binding, ASEAN Secretary-General Le 
Luonh Minh hoped that it would pave the way toward substantial negotiations. The 
Philippines, as one of the claimants who desired a binding code of conduct, also declared 
that they would be open to take steps that may improve the binding nature of the CoC 
(Dancel, 2017) 
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The beginning of the finalization of the CoC started in August 2018 during the 51st 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Joint Communiqué in Singapore. In the communiqué, senior 
officials from ASEAN member states agreed on several additional points in relation to 
the CoC (Thayer, 2011; Thayer, 2018). First, all parties shall uphold the CoC negotiating 
text during the negotiation process. Second, the negotiating text will become the basis for 
further negotiations. Third, all parties possess the right to consult internally with their 
respective domestic institutions and to register new suggestions during the negotiation 
process.  
Based on those agreed points, the single draft CoC was compiled. The draft consists 
of 19 A4-sized pages and is divided into three parts: preambular provisions, general 
provisions, and final clauses. The draft, however, still suffers from one of the earliest 
disagreements among member states as it does not clearly define the geographical scope 
of the "South China Sea." Indonesia suggested that the concerned parties respect the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelves of coastal states as per the 
UNCLOS 1982. Vietnam, on the other hand, simply stated that the CoC must encompass 
all the features of the dispute and all the contested area as per the UNCLOS 1982.  
From the perspective of legal status, the single draft does not recommend CoC as 
an agreement proper under international law. In page five point 15, the draft emphasizes 
that "CoC is not an instrument to settle territorial disputes or maritime delimitation 
issues." Although the draft often refers to international law in general and UNCLOS in 
particular, the draft does not explicitly express obligations for signatories’ states to abide 
by the provisions in UNCLOS; for example, to use arbitration. The single draft also tends 
to be flexible as concerned parties are allowed to add to or remove their suggestions from 
the draft. All things considered; the single draft does not serve as a legal basis for dispute 
settlement mechanism. That being said, in points f and g in page 12 regarding incident 
management, Indonesia offers:  
“The Parties agreed, as appropriate, to resort to the High Council of the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), at the consent of the Parties concerned, to settle any 
dispute relating to incidents that may arise in the South China Sea; The Parties 
agreed that any unresolved incident may be referred to an appropriate international 
dispute settlement mechanism, at the consent of the concerned Parties”. 
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Indonesia's recommendation was one of the most fleshed out compared to any other 
participants. Myanmar, for example, only suggested concerned parties to settle through 
calm and constructive means. Vietnam suggested concerned parties to resolve the conflict 
“through friendly negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation and other means as may 
be agreed by the disputing Contracting Parties.” While China suggested joint military 
exercise and hotline communication lines between the institutions-in-charge of every 
party. 
However, even with the absence of dispute settlement mechanism in the SCS issue, 
the single draft still expresses the obligations of all parties to promote maritime 
cooperation among each other. Except for China, the draft includes cooperation in these 
five fields: marine environmental protection, marine science research, navigation 
security, communication on the sea, and measures against transnational crimes. 
Cambodia added the importance of connectivity on the sea while China suggested the 
development and conservation of fishery resources, cooperation on enforcing 
international law and maritime security, navigation security and search and rescue 
operations, marine science research and marine environmental protection, marine 
economy, and marine culture.  
 
Conclusion 
When the early negotiation process for CoC was taking place in early 2000s, ASEAN and 
China could not agree on four important points. First, geographical scope; second, 
prohibition of construction on the SCS; third, military activity in and around the Spratly 
Islands; fourth, whether it is acceptable to arrest and detain fishermen operating in the 
disputed area. The failure led to the creation of non-binding DoC in 2002. Similar thing 
re-occurs in the negotiation process for the Single Draft of CoC. Geographical scope is 
not clearly defined and the draft does not prohibit infrastructure-building or military 
activities in the area. Regarding fisheries resources, concerned parties only agreed to 
establish maritime cooperation.   
As such, at its very essence, the single draft is a mere compilation of suggestions 
from ASEAN member states and China. If anything, the draft serves only as a reference 
in the implementation of CoC. The talk for the CoC began in 1996, in the aftermath of 
China’s occupation of the Mischief Reed in 1995. For a similar incident to occur before 
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another breakthrough is made in the dispute settlement process would be the last thing 
ASEAN needs. 
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